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AT THE CROSSROADS OF
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY:
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, OCTOBER 23, 1999
Ira Magaziner*
This afternoon, I would like to share with you some of my
thoughts on the ways in which the Internet is transforming society,
and some of the principles I helped shape and implement to respond
to and promote these transformations as senior advisor to the Presi-
dent for policy development in this arena.
We enter the new millennium in the midst of a revolution, an in-
formation revolution. As you look back on the sweep of human his-
tory there have only been a few major transformational changes to
human society. We have the privilege of living through one of them
For thousands of years, human economy and social organization
was based on nomadic tribes that hunted and gathered their food.
Then, some technological advances gave rise to agrarian societies-
such as the ability to use certain metals, to plant seeds, to husband
animals, and to use the wheel. These inventions made agrarian-
based societies possible, and these societies were fundamentally dif-
ferent from the nomadic tribes in their economic, social, and legal
structures.
About a quarter of a millennium ago, the industrial revolution
began, driven by such technological advances as the harnessing of
electricity and the steam engine. It took place over the course of
about 100 to 150 years as it spread through the developed countries
in the world. Industrialization is still spreading into some of the de-
veloping countries. These advances wrought fundamental changes
in economic, social, and legal paradigms. During each of these
* President, SJS, Inc., a business strategy consulting and investment fimn;
January 1993 to December 1998, Senior Advisor to the President of the United
States for Policy Development Thanks to David Steele and Alan Heinrich for
editing the address for publication.
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transformations, the relationships among societies changed dramati-
cally. Leading societies that failed to master the new technologies
were surpassed by those societies that did.
We are now going through a transformation which is every bit
as significant as those others. This transformation has been ad-
vanced by two major developments. The first is the ability to proc-
ess a massive amount of information very rapidly on the smallest of
microprocessors. The second, which is less often discussed, is the
ability to communicate by light--the substitution of photons for
electrons. It is now possible to send the entire contents of the Li-
brary of Congress across the United States in under fourteen seconds
on a single optical fiber as thin as a human hair. This combination of
the ability to communicate by light with the ability to process mas-
sive amounts of information at very rapid speeds is creating another
revolution which has come together in the Internet to form a com-
mon basis for communication and commerce. This revolution is less
than a tenth of a century old and it will probably play itself out over a
couple of decades.
This revolution has already transformed our economy. The
Internet economy is real. Our government now estimates that the
development of the Internet infrastructure-just the development of
the Internet--has been responsible for an average of 35% of the real
growth of the U.S. economy from 1995 to 1998.1 Over 55% of total
investment of venture capital in 1997 went to the information tech-
nology sector.2 If you add electronic commerce to that, as well as
the productivity effects of electronic commerce, I believe that almost
two-thirds of the real growth of the U.S. economy is coming from the
Internet economy.3 And it is the major reason why the U.S. econ-
omy is performing so much better than every other economy in the
world. It is having an incredibly dramatic economic impact. And
this has occurred as a result of the fact that the Internet increased
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY II
tbl.2.3 (1999) ("IT Producing Industries: Contribution to Real Economic
Growtli"), available at <http://www.ecommerce.gov/ede/report.html>.
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY
A2-5 app. 2 ("Building out the Internet") (1998), available at
<http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.html>.
3. See id.
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from having one million to 150 million users.4 Consider what will
happen when this figure jumps from twenty million to a billion peo-
ple. These trends are only going to accelerate. The amount of busi-
ness-to-business electronic commerce was zero three years ago and
will go up to about two trillion dollars by the year 2003. The Inter-
net is reshaping the whole economy in dramatic fashion.
I want to illustrate just how quickly this information revolution
is playing out. In 1994, President Clinton asked me to chair a joint
National Security Council-National Economic Council initiative and
identify the most important things the administration could do to
continue the current economic expansion. We had a list of things to
look at, and we held hearings around the country, and what we
eventually came up with was not even on our original list. I will
never forget the meeting where I presented our findings. Although
the NSF had just opened the Internet up for commercialization a little
over a year earlier,6 I nevertheless projected that the Internet and
electronic commerce were going to drive the world economy for the
next couple of decades. When I did that, something happened that
would be repeated with every subsequent six-month forecast I is-
sued: everyone around the table laughed and said, "You know, you
are dreaming, that is utopian." But every one of those forecasts
turned out to be conservative by many orders of magnitude. The re-
ality outstripped the projections, even though everybody thought the
projections were considerably overblown.
The President understood the significance of these developments
and created a group, which I chaired, to develop a strategy that
would enable the Internet to expand for the economic benefit of the
country and the world. We brought together about eighteen agencies
of government to develop that strategy, which we then issued as "A
Framework For Global Electronic Commerce ' 7 and promoted
throughout the world. I am going to give you some of the highlights
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline (visited Feb. 21,
2000) <http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/History/HIT.html> (the de-
finitive Internet history).
7. William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Elec-
tronic Commerce (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/
ecomn.htrn>.
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of our strategy and some of the significant issues that we are con-
fronting today as the Internet revolution spreads throughout the
world.
The administration had two central concerns in developing this
strategy. The first was the lack of a predictable global legal envi-
ronment for doing business electronically. 8 For example, there is no
uniform approach to digital signatures. Some countries recognize the
legal effect of certain types of digital signature; some countries do
not recognize any. The second concern was that some governments
would strangle the Internet through over-regulation--taxation, cen-
sorship, etc.9 Indeed, there was evidence that this was already be-
ginning to occur, even by our own government. Laws were begin-
ning to be enacted censoring Internet content and there were many
states looking at taxing Internet transactions.'0 The European Union
was considering a "bit tax" on every transmission over the Internet."
So, we had to develop a strategy that would address those issues.
The one thing we knew for certain, and it was the only thing we
knew for certain as we developed this strategy, was that we did not
know where all this was headed: The changes were just too rapid
and there were too many complex interactions. We therefore wanted
to be certain that we did not take aggressive actions that might have
negative unintended consequences. Thus, we formulated a series of
general principles to help guide us in our policy development.
I. PRINCIPLE 1: PRIVATE SECTOR LEADERSHIP
The first principle was that where government action with re-
spect to the Internet is necessary, private sector leadership should be
the primary mode for carrying out that action. 12 We are Democrats,
we do not dislike government; we think government has a very im-
portant role to play in society. With respect to health care, I would
espouse a very active government role to provide adequate health
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Vertex, Internet Taxation: State Summaries (last modified Jan. 18,
2000) <http://www.vertexinc.com/taxcybrary20/CyberTaxChannel/
taxsum_73.html>.
11. See The Internet Tax Freedom Act Home Page (visited Feb. 26, 2000)
<http://www.house.gov/cox/nettax/>.
12. See Clinton & Gore, supra note 7.
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care to everyone in society. But the Internet moves too quickly. The
processes of government are too slow, inflexible, and bureaucratic to
effectively address Internet changes. And we were afraid that the
development of the Internet would be strangled by excessive gov-
ernment regulation and intrusion.
Thus, we determined that private collective action was prefer-
able to government action in a variety of areas. One such example of
this was the technical coordination of the Internet routing system.
Many people actually felt that the International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU), because it is the body that coordinates world-
wide telecommunications protocols, should be the organization coor-
dinating the Internet routing system. The ITU is comprised of over
150 nations and includes the government regulators from those na-
tions. 13 So many in our government, and in other governments, were
advocating that we turn the technical coordination of the Internet
over to the ITU because it was maturing and becoming a significant
worldwide economic force. We took the opposite approach, believ-
ing that vesting the ITU with control over Internet routing would
only bog down the Internet. Considering how the regulatory author-
ity in one country can impede the progress of the Internet, you can
imagine our concern at turning over the technical coordination of the
Internet to an organization comprised of the regulatory authorities of
150 countries. Our concerns were highlighted by the fact that the
ITU initially rejected the use of packet switched networks for global
communications systems, and continued to reject packet switched
networks for the next eight years in the face of the development and
growth of the Internet.
14
So instead, we adopted a new model of government action to
advance our new Internet policy. We followed the models of the
Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Architecture Board,
which coordinated the formation of Internet protocols in the early
13. See International Telecommunication Union, International Telecommu-
nication Union Homepage (last modified Apr. 23, 1999) <http://www.itu.int/>.
14. See Total Telecom Homepage (visited Apr. 12, 2000)
<http://www.totaltele.com>.
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years of the Internet. 15 These organizations comprised stakeholder-
based groups that operated in a fairly democratic manner and devel-
oped protocols among technical experts from around the world.
We delegated specific Internet coordination functions to a pri-
vate, international, non-profit stakeholder-based group that govern-
ments would recognize under certain conditions of charter. 16 This
policy reflected our belief that the Internet should be a free, decen-
tralized medium--but one still requiring coordination. Obviously, if
the stakeholder-based group in some way became renegade or got
captured by a particular special interest, governments may need to
step in to force a reorganization. But private stakeholder-based
groups, rather than intergovernmental entities, should be the first line
of coordination.
We envisioned a number of stakeholder-based groups, each fo-
cusing on a set of core issues, working together. We started with the
domain-name system, setting in motion the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),17 which is now in the
process of trying to coordinate the domain-name system. We hope
and expect that there will be a development of private stakeholder-
based groups dedicated to solving problems surrounding specific is-
sues such as privacy protection and consumer protection. This
model of delegating authority to private stakeholder-based groups
will provide more flexible, faster moving, and ultimately more ef-
fective coordination of the Internet.
This model can also be used to address some of the difficulties
surrounding Internet enforcement issues-issues that are very rele-
vant to the jurisdiction questions you are exploring today in your
moot court project. Consider, for example, the extremely important
15. See Internet Engineering Task Force, Overview of the IETF (visited
Feb. 24, 2000) <http://www.ietf.org/overview.html>; Internet Architecture
Board, JAB Overview (last modified Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.iab.org/
iab/overview.html>; Zakon, supra note 6.
16. For example, ICANN's charter takes the form of a Memorandum of
Understanding with the U.S. Government. See Memorandum of Understand-
ing Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (visited Feb. 2000) <http://www.icann.org/
general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm>.
17. See id.
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issue of on-line privacy protection. Privacy protection is a funda-
mental value. It is also something that is necessary to ensure that
people feel comfortable using the Internet. Nevertheless, we have
resisted proposing a comprehensive on-line privacy law for several
reasons. The primary reason was that even if we passed the most
comprehensive on-line privacy law, we did not know how it could
be enforced. Consider the fact that there are 20,000 Web sites
forming every week and no government agency can monitor them
all.'8 And even if you find one that you think may be violating the
law that you passed, it may have its server in the Seychelles one
week and Bermuda the next, so tracking it down-and acquiring ju-
risdiction over it once you locate it-would be difficult. We thought
that to pass a largely unenforceable law is to lie to the people. It is to
say, "Do not worry, we are protecting your privacy, we passed a
law," when in fact we cannot do so.
So what do you do? Do you just give up and say you cannot
protect privacy? No. What we suggest is a different paradigm: to
encourage private stakeholder-based groups to form and develop
non-governmental self-regulatory approaches to the problem. For
example, in this country we now have the Online Privacy Alliance,' 9
as well as the Better Business Bureau20 and a group called TRUSTe2'
that are self-regulating watchdog groups. These organizations base
their philosophy on an accepted group of privacy principles crafted
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development. 2
According to these principles, operators of on-line sites must provide
18. See Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline (visited Feb. 21,
2000) <http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/History/HIT.html#Growth>.
19. See Online Privacy Alliance (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<http://www.privacyalliance.org/>.
20. See The Better Business Bureau System (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<http://www.bbb.org/>. For the Better Business Bureau's Childrens' Adver-
tising Review Unit's Privacy Guidelines see Better Business Bureau: Guide-
lines for Childrens 'Advertising (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.caru.org
caruguid.asp>.
21. See TRUSTe: Building a Web You Can Believe In (visited Feb. 22,
2000) <http://www.truste.org/>.
22. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA
(1981).
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notice of their information collection practices to their visitors, in-
cluding how they intend to use the information they collect. Next,
they must provide their visitors with the opportunity to opt out if they
do not want their personal information used in the proposed manner.
Finally, there must be monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in
place under the auspices of private self-regulatory groups. These
groups confer seals denoting that a site is following the privacy prin-
ciples, they audit sites to ensure continuing compliance, and they
provide a forum for redress to handle consumer grievances.
With this kind of self-regulatory system in place, government
can protect consumers by warning them to be careful when visiting
sites that do not have a privacy seal--and at the same time, avoid
strangling the Internet with burdensome and ineffective regulation.
With the cooperation of industry, the government can go to consum-
ers and say, "Look, the Internet is a free place, you can go wherever
you want, but be careful. If you go to a Web site that does not have
one of these privacy symbols, your privacy may not be protected."
Of course, some consumers may not care, and that is their right; but
other consumers will care and consequently will only visit sites that
have privacy seals. This system creates a market incentive for com-
panies to participate in the self-regulatory system by joining one of
the privacy organizations and getting a seal; otherwise, they limit
their market. But the government does not coerce them into partici-
pating. This approach recognizes that the Internet should remain a
free environment; but at the same time, the government continues to
have a role in empowering people by giving them the tools and in-
formation to protect themselves as they see fit.
This private, self-regulatory approach to Internet governance
also avoids some difficult jurisdictional issues. Private sector watch-
dog groups are forming throughout the world: in the U.S. it is the
Better Business Bureau and TRUSTe; in Japan and Europe, a num-
ber of business organizations are forming. These organizations will
use common symbols or seals, and these seals will have similar
meanings. Thus, whether you visit a Web site from Japan, Europe,
or the United States, if you see such a seal, you will know that your
privacy is protected even though different groups in different coun-
tries are in charge of monitoring and enforcement.
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Governments will come to recognize this approach as the first
line of defense in ensuring privacy protection. Of course, there must
still be some kind of government backup--in the United States, it is
the Federal Trade Commission--so that if an entity fraudulently dis-
plays a seal or knowingly and repeatedly violates the self-regulatory
organization's rules, it can be referred for prosecution. But that is a
more manageable task for the government, and it is not the first line
of defense for privacy protection. Will this approach work perfectly?
Of course not. But we think that it will work more effectively, and
bog down the progress of the Internet less, than if each government
passes its own set of privacy laws, enforced by its own privacy
boards. Such an approach would create enormous confusion. Inevi-
tably, each nation's privacy law would differ from the others'-and
all of them would be difficult to enforce.
Thus, one very important principle underlying our Internet pol-
icy was to favor private collective action over governmental action.
Let me again emphasize that we are not absolutely certain that this is
the right approach. But it seemed to us most prudent to first let pri-
vate sector leadership try to develop the rules of the road for the
Internet through private collective action. If this does not work, the
government can always step in and pass a law. On the other hand, if
it is the government that first tries to set the rules of the road for the
Internet by passing a law, it becomes much more difficult to take
corrective action if the law proves to be flawed.
II. PRINCIPLE 2: A MARKET-DRiv INTERNET
A second principle underlying our Internet policy was to regard
the Internet as a market driven arena rather than as a regulated arena.
The initial reaction of most other governments was to regard the
Internet as a regulated industry. Telecommunications and broadcast
media are regulated industries-in the United States, by the Federal
Communications Commission-and the Internet was regarded as an
extension of communications policy, hence an arena to be regulated.
We took the opposite position for two reasons.
First, governments initially regulated telecommunications be-
cause when the telecommunications infrastructure was built, the size
of investment necessary relative to the size of the companies in the
industry was huge. Therefore, governments licensed monopolies to
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build the infrastructure, and they accordingly had to regulate those
monopolies. With the Internet, the exact opposite situation prevails:
The competition to develop the Internet will be the greatest in the
history of free enterprise. Satellite companies, wireless companies,
telecommunications companies, consumer electronics companies,
computer companies, software companies, and electric utilities are
all going to be in competition to build out the Internet. The best
thing that we can do is to allow that competition to occur free fiom
government regulation.
Second, governments initially regulated broadcast media be-
cause there was a similar problem with respect to competition due to
the limited amount of spectrum available. The government became
involved in the allocation of the broadcast spectrum and therefore it
regulated it because it was conferring an economic value. With the
Internet, there is almost unlimited bandwidth, so the problem of allo-
cating spectrum does not arise in the same way.
For those reasons, we determined that the Internet should be a
market-driven environment rather than a regulated environment.
Therefore, the FCC is not regulating the packet-switched networks
now. We cannot undo the old circuit switch regulation-but that is
becoming a smaller and smaller part of the telecommunications uni-
verse. And the Internet will basically remain a market-driven envi-
ronment. What makes that especially significant is that in the years
ahead, the Internet, broadcast, and telephone will converge. We will
have the Internet on television, broadcast on computer, and we will
make telephone calls from both. What we are saying is that this con-
verged environment should be a market-driven environment, not a
regulated environment.
III. PRINCIPLE 3: NARROWLY TARGETED GOVERNMENT AcTION
A third principle underlying our Internet policy was that when
government action is required-which will, of course, happen in
certain circumstances-such action should be in the form of precise
and narrowly targeted laws rather than broad omnibus bills. Con-
sider once again the issue of Internet privacy protection. While we
favored self-regulation, someone pointed out during congressional
testimony that current bankruptcy law might frustrate consumer
privacy protection. Suppose I provided personal information to a
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company with the understanding that the business would only use
such information internally and would not sell it to third parties.
Then that company goes bankrupt and is taken over by a new entity.
That entity is not necessarily bound by its predecessor's agreements
with respect to the personal information collected from consumers.
And so there was a broad consensus that some legislation ought to be
enacted that would protect consumers from this scenario. Govern-
ment action was required, but the action was taken in a precise and
focused way rather than in an omnibus or globalized way that would
be too bureaucratic.
IV. PRiNCiPLE 4: RESPECT FOR THE NATURE OF THE INTERNET
A fourth principle underlying our Internet policy was the hardest
one for some people to deal with: Whatever we do we must respect
the nature of the Internet. By its very nature, the Internet is an arena
where technology evolves very rapidly. Thus, all Internet policy
must be technology-neutral--lest it become outmoded before it is
even enacted. Similarly, because the Internet is an inherently decen-
tralized medium, any attempt to impose centralized control over it-
even if this was desirable, which I believe is not the case-would be
impossible. And life is too short to spend too much time trying to do
things that are impossible. For example, with respect to censorship,
it is extremely attractive from a political perspective to be concerned
about objectionable content that children might be exposed to on the
Internet. Indeed, as a parent of young children, I have been con-
cerned about this, too. But the knee-jerk reaction in Congress was to
pass laws to try to censor the Internet.23 Thankfully, such laws were
struck down under the First Amendment 24-but we did succeed in
changing administration policy on this issue, as well, so that the ad-
ministration now opposes such restrictions on the Internet.
But once more, the Internet requires a new paradigm for gov-
ernment action. As the governments of Singapore and China have
learned, even if we wanted to censor the Internet we would face an
23. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223
(1999). The CDA criminally prohibited the use of any "interactive computer
service to display in a manner available to persons under 18 years of age" cer-
tain "patently offensive" materials. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B).
24. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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impossible task. Unless the government tries to confiscate every ra-
dio, every television, every telephone, and every computer in the
country, and unless it shoots down all the satellites, it will be impos-
sible to keep the Internet out or censor it.
Consider China. In 1996, Chinese officials intended to control
Internet content by creating their own super intranet-but by 1998,
they understood that they could not do that. They also understood
that the Internet was going to be an engine of the economy and
something that they should allow to develop.
Thus, the paradigm should not be one of government censorship.
The paradigm should be to empower parents to protect their own
households. When you sign up with an Internet Service Provider,
there should be choices that you can make according to your own
value system as a parent. Maybe there will be a Christian Coalition
filtering package, or a children's television network filtering pack-
age, and you as a parent can choose what filter you want that might
limit the content that comes into your own home. If you wish, you
might want to let everything come through and use your own
browser or search engine software to filter out what you do not want.
If you love violence and you hate sex you can filter out the sex and
keep the violence. It should be your choice. The key principle,
though, is to provide people with the tools to do what they wish in
their own homes, according to their own value systems. And one of
the great things about the Internet is that it makes this approach pos-
sible because it is the ultimate customizable environment.
V. PRiNCIPLE 5: A SEAMLESS GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
The final principle underlying our Internet policy involves the
recognition that this is the first market to be born on a global scale.
Traditionally, industries grow up within national borders, and then
nations negotiate with each other so that their industries may work
together on a global scale. This is not the case here: Internet indus-
tries are global from the moment of their birth. Therefore, from the
very beginning we need to try to create a global, seamless market-
place which will allow for the free flow of commerce. For this rea-
son, during my final year and a half in the administration, we negoti-
ated a dozen different international trade agreements involving most
1176
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of the developed countries of the world, covering such areas as copy-
right, taxation, tariffs, privacy, content, and the like.
VI. POLICY RESULTS
We have had a great deal of success with the agenda that we laid
out in these principles. In fact, this was actually one of the only
agendas that passed with very large bipartisan majorities over the
past couple of years. We succeeded in reaching agreement with most
of the developed nations of the world with respect to the privatiza-
tion of the technical management of the Internet. We reached
agreement on the self-regulatory approach towards privacy and con-
tent issues, along the lines described above. We have also succeeded
in getting the World Trade Organization to agree that Internet com-
merce should be free of customs duties.25 Similarly, on the domestic
front, we passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act,26 which declared a
moratorium on discriminatory taxation against the Internet and
against every jurisdiction doing its own form of taxation, and we are
now trying to develop a uniform tax-neutral approach to electronic
commerce. Finally, we reached agreement on a uniform commercial
code approach, rather than a regulatory approach, towards the Inter-
net so that contracts can now be made electronically. 27 This under-
scores that the role of government in the market-driven Internet envi-
ronment is not to regulate, but to provide uniform commercial code
so that a buyer and seller can come together and make terms as they
wish-but then have, if they wish, global legal protection. This work
is now moving along well. We have already passed a law in the
United States recognizing, in a uniform way, electronic contracts
formed over the Internet.28 This approach to electronic commercial
law will have a global reach due to mutual recognition agreements
25. See CNET News.Corn, WTO: No Net Taxes for a Year (visited Feb. 22,
2000) <http://www.news.com:80/News/Item/0,4,22354,00.html?owv>.
26. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719
(1998).
27. See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) (visited
Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/pru72999.html>; see also
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment
(1996) (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electconm/
ml-ec.htm> (as adopted in 1998).
28. See MilleniumDigital Commerce Act, S. 761, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999).
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and the adoption of international model laws. So in a variety of
ways, we have hopefully launched, on a global scale, a free-market
oriented approach to the Internet.
The Internet will continue to produce significant social and po-
litical changes. It will be a tremendous force for democracy. Dicta-
torship relies on control of information. With the Internet, govern-
ments will not be able to control information. In fact, we found that
it is going to do a great deal to open up our own political processes,
as well. We did something with this effort that had never been done
before in government: We took the first draft of a policy paper that
we produced at the end of 1996 and we put it up on the Internet for
comment. We treated it as a virtual document: We went through
eighteen drafts, all on-line, all the comments were on-line and
posted, and all our meetings were on-line and posted. Thanks to the
Internet, we had an open process of forming this policy. Of course,
we got some of the things you would expect-comments like, "The
best thing you could do is die," and so on. But most of the com-
ments we received were quite good, and they came from people you
would usually never hear from in Washington. As a result of these
comments, we had probably one hundred very good modifications to
the document over the course of these drafts. And the fact that we
had such an open process meant that by the time we issued the strat-
egy, there was a great deal of consensus around it and it worked very
well. Since then, we have done that with all subsequent Internet
Policy Group papers, and the government is starting to do it in other
areas, as well. I believe that this will have a very positive effect.
29
VII. THE BusmEss REVOLUTION
Let me close my remarks with some thoughts on how I see the
Internet transforming the business and legal communities in the next
few years. We will see fundamental changes in business models and
the way business is done. For example, accountants today value
companies largely based on their physical assets. In the Internet age,
physical assets are going to be more of a negative than a positive.
The three major assets a company has are the quality of its
29. Note that the same thing is going on with litigation. See Berkman
Center for Internet & Society, OpenLaw-Home (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw>.
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workforce, its intellectual property, and its brand. Brand is impor-
tant, because in a world with virtually unlimited consumer choice
and information, consumers will look for products they recognize
and trust. These three assets are usually grouped together as good-
will and are considered the sort of ephemeral things that cannot be
adequately valued under current accounting principles. In the future,
they will be the most important assets a company has, so we need to
reevaluate the way we account for them.
Next, companies are not going to want to be vertically inte-
grated, which is very different than what we saw in the industrial
age. Instead, companies are going to focus very narrowly on areas
where they have a competitive advantage, and then they are going to
form networks to get the rest of what they need from others who
have their own competitive advantage in each narrow sliver of activ-
ity. And so a corporate entity is going to exist more as an informal
network, or a network of agreements formed among groups of peo-
ple. And because there are going to be so many agreements formed
and a lot of flexibility in that process, the existing processes by
which contracts are negotiated among companies are going to change
dramatically. If you talk to entrepreneurs who are engaged in these
kinds of activities, they are looking for ways now to standardize such
agreements and facilitate their on-line formation. These kinds of
companies are forming now. In fact, I had a teleconference last night
with a large Australian law firm that is contemplating its future. I
said that their biggest competitors are not the law firms they are used
to competing against; their biggest competitors are companies that
they have never heard of who are now forming ways to do their
business on-line. In New York, for example, in the financial arena,
there are a couple of new start-up companies that will be going pub-
lic in the next couple of months that are putting financial process
closings on-line--these on-line closings will be done at about one
one-hundredth of the cost and about fifty times the speed of normal
closings. And I believe that most Internet companies are going to
use them instead of using traditional law firms. So, the legal profes-
sion will be going through a dramatic change as the nature of the
corporation itself changes.
There will also be a new definition of investment. Prior to
joining the administration, I was a business strategy consultant.
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Until the early nineties, our business focused on CEOs of large com-
panies who had to make investment decisions and wanted a second
opinion from an outside consultant. They would go through compli-
cated discounted cash flow rate of return analyses and would take
months and months to make a decision because each investment was
so important that they did not want to get it wrong. In the Internet
age, there will be an entirely different philosophy. Speed will be
crucial. When you have markets that are growing at fifty or one
hundred percent a year, you cannot take a year to make a decision on
whether to make the investment. Instead, the realization will emerge
that there are multiple different technological possibilities, and mul-
tiple different market outcome possibilities corresponding to these
technologies. No one knows for sure which ones are going to win
and which ones are not. So investors will place bets on many of
them. For the most successful investors, five out of ten of their in-
vestments will fail; for investors who do moderately well, about
eight out of ten will fail-but the one or two businesses that succeed
will more than pay for the others. So we will see an entirely differ-
ent philosophy of investment and risk-taking.
Similarly, there will be a new definition of success and failure.
The successful business executive in the past was one who never
made mistakes-he was very cautious, very slow moving and so on.
In the future, it will be the entrepreneurs who get rewarded even
within companies, and that will occasion a major change in the na-
ture of the employee/employer relationship. If human capital is one
of your most important assets and you are in an entrepreneurial envi-
ronment, a stake in the company becomes crucial as opposed to a
base salary. This will fundamentally alter professional service firms
as well as other firms.
Finally, the relative position of large companies versus small
companies is going to change. Traditionally, a large company al-
ways had an advantage over a small one because it had more re-
sources at its disposal. What the financial markets are saying to-
day-and I personally think it is a rational thing to say-is that we
know that nine out often companies we are funding are going to fail,
but the one that succeeds will create far more value than the nine that
fail, and therefore the overall value we are giving this new economy
is right. The other thing they are saying-and this is something to
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give pause to all large companies-is that we do not think that many
large companies are going to be the winners in the new economy.
There may be some, but we do not think they will be the winners as a
whole, because they are not going to be flexible enough to be able to
change their corporate cultures. So we are going to bet on the small
new guys.
It was a real watershed when Worldcom bought MCI, the six
billion dollar company buying the thirty billion dollar company. Be-
cause Worldcom had a bigger market capitalization, it could do it.
We will see a lot more of these transactions, because the financial
markets favor the small agile company much more than the big dino-
saurs who are not able to move quickly or change their cultures, and
who have CEOs who are too used to acting in the old ways. And so
this will be another fundamental change transforming the business
world.
We are living through a revolutionary period today. The law is
going to have to adapt to these revolutionary changes. Let me finish
on this note. One of the first things I did when the President said,
"This is going to be important, go ahead and do it," was to read some
histories of the industrial revolution. It was very interesting because
there were a number of countries who understood that change was
coming and they embraced the change by fundamentally transform-
ing their legal, commercial, and economic systems. There were
other countries, including some who were leaders in the pre-
industrial world, which could not change because the old ways of
doing things were just too strong. And there was virtually a 100%
correlation between those nations that changed and succeeded, and
those who could not change and fell backward. As a result, new
world leaders-economic leaders and political leaders--emerged.
We are in a similar revolutionary period. I believe that the challenge
our legal system faces is this: Are we going to try to force the great
creativity of this new Internet economy into old legal models, or are
we going to realize that we have to adapt those models and transform
them to enable this revolution to continue to flourish?
Of course, we have to worry about the negative side effects of
the revolution. There will be new types of crime, potential violations
of privacy, a whole range of things to worry about, and we need a le-
gal system that can help us negotiate our way through these perils.
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But such a legal system is going to have to operate much faster than
it does now. It is going to have to change a lot of the ways it does
things to be more relevant to the world changing around it. If we fail
to do that, we will fall behind. This is the real challenge for our legal
system in this new world. On the other hand, it is a very exciting
time to be alive. We have a privilege that few generations have---to
live through a major revolutionary period that can be a force for great
positive change in human history. So we have an exciting challenge
before us and hopefully we will be brave enough and forward-
thinking enough to exercise that challenge in a way that will benefit
our children and grandchildren.
